

English Translation — Message No. 36 (SHAMA)

Great Nation of Iran,

On a night exactly like this in the year 1356, the President of the United States, in Tehran, called our country—within the unstable Middle East—an “**island of stability and tranquility**.” Yet only **seven days** later, you created a revolution in this so-called island of stability and tranquility that sent a 2,500-year system to the archives of history. But after victory, Khomeini—who had won your trust—**betrayed** that trust and opened a path whose outcome was poverty, decline, plunder, repression, and corruption. After several failed uprisings, you have found the remedy in **another revolution**, and now you are in the **heart of revolution**. Therefore, drawing lessons from the deviation of the 1357 revolution and the subsequent unsuccessful uprisings, we present the following points to your attention:

1) The first lesson from past experiences is to ask: how did Khomeini—an reactionary cleric who opposed the Shah because women were granted the right to vote (even if symbolic and ceremonial) and because of land reform—deceive us as a progressive, democratic, freedom-seeking leader and seize the leadership of the 1357 revolution? Could delegating power to someone who did not know the basics of politics, international relations, international law, and social governance have produced anything other than extrajudicial executions and foolish ideological whims that laid the groundwork for the eight-year war, Iran’s isolation, and...? If Khomeini knew the basics of politics, international law, and international relations, would he have supported the seizure of the U.S. embassy and the hostage-taking of its diplomats and staff?! Would he have threatened to destroy and eliminate Israel from the face of the earth?! And would he have encouraged the people and army of Iraq to rise against Saddam Hussein, thereby imposing a devastating war on Iran?!

2) In the absence of a capable opposition—and while those claiming to be opposition generally lack the capacities necessary to shoulder the heavy responsibilities of managing a “national uprising,” and more than possessing “opposition qualities” merely display the “qualities of discontent,” and, without regard to the “speed of developments” in Iran, still waste time and resources planning seminars, conferences, and congresses—the National Council of Iran’s Revolutionary Transition was formed a year ago. It was formed through close monitoring of national, regional, and international developments; awareness of the country’s “war–revolutionary” condition and its “pre-revolutionary” circumstances; and recognition of dangers threatening the country—from the likelihood of a “blind uprising,” from “foreign aggressions,” and from “domestic mercenaries and traitors and separatists,” particularly the danger of a “power vacuum,” “insecurity,” “chaos,” and “revenge-taking” that may follow the “collapse” of the government and could ultimately lead to “civil war” and the “disintegration of the country.” It thus devised the necessary measures to confront these dangers so that the country may pass this “sharp historical turn” safely and successfully. It has such command over the country’s political sphere that it adopts appropriate positions alongside developments and even ahead of them.

3) We observe a “carrot-and-stick” policy: on the one hand, the government and Pezeshkian recognize the protests, propose negotiations with protesters, and emphasize restraint toward the nation; some law-enforcement personnel and other armed forces, who both acknowledge the people’s protests as rightful and call on colleagues not to confront protesters; and within the “royal stable” called the Islamic Consultative Assembly, criticism of the government has taken on a

protest-like and aggressive character. On the other hand, we see the showing of teeth by some “fire-at-will” elements of the removed leader. This resembles the disintegration of the Shah’s government and its nadir of weakness in 1357, when on one side “martial law” was imposed and on the other side Jafar Sharif-Emami, the prime minister, was engaged in “negotiations with revolutionaries and granting concessions.” This “duality” not only failed to solve the problem but revealed the government’s “helplessness.” Today, this helplessness, disorder, and nadir of weakness are visible in the clearest form. Therefore, any “retreat” from demands is an unwise act; on the contrary, this weakness and helplessness must make us “more determined and more decisive” to continue our path. Hence, by strengthening “national solidarity” and “organizing” the struggle and establishing “order and discipline” with the cooperation of spontaneous popular “committees” in all neighborhoods—formed with 3 or 5 members—through a “bottom-up pyramid system,” and simultaneously avoiding any “pause” in strikes, protests, and civil disobedience, we shall ensure the “continuity” of this process in the struggle.

4) Just as Sardar Ghaib-Parvar and Abazari revealed the disobedience of commanders and heroes of the Sacred Defense toward the orders of the removed leader and treacherous Commander-in-Chief during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, and in addition, 58 IRGC commanders, including Hossein Salami and Gholam-Ali Rashid, together with the Minister of Intelligence, in a meeting with Khamenei on 1401/10/13, jointly declared that their forces consider the people’s protests “legitimate and rightful” and are not willing to confront the people; and in two remarkable instances, one IRGC commander in Abadan said that his forces not only would not confront the protesting people but, should Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi intervene as in Aban 1398, they would stand “against Hashd al-Shaabi forces” alongside the people; and Sardar Gholam-Ali Rashid reported two cases within one month of “unauthorized activation of the IRGC artillery,” one of which targeted the “spider-web house of leadership”—therefore we are confident that the armed forces will be “alongside the people,” and we must not hesitate in decisively continuing the path of struggle.

Accordingly, it is stipulated that:

- A) As previously announced, all commanders of the national armed forces of Iran have been retained in their command positions.
- B) The national armed forces of Iran shall declare their support for the people and their bond with the great nation of Iran.
- C) The national armed forces shall remain in full readiness to defend the country with authority against any threat or aggression.
- D) The national armed forces shall declare their loyalty to the nation and obedience to the orders of the National Council of Iran’s Revolutionary Transition.

Victorious national armed forces of Iran
Proud nation of Iran
Long live Iran

National Council of Iran’s Revolutionary Transition
1404/10/10